Ponad 40 lat później Wojna trwa nadal P. Effiong.pdf

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40+ Years Later…The War Hasn’t Ended…
By Philip U. Effiong, PhD
Professor of English
University of Maryland University College
Adelphi, Maryland
(Published in
The Nigeria-Biafra War,
Ed. Chima J. Korieh, New York: Cambria Press,
2012, 261-276)
Introduction
The end of the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War was marked by a bold, even if noble “no
victor, no vanquished” proclamation for which General Yakubu Gowon has understandably
received wide acclaim. But, whether sincere or not, history continues to convey a different
message, redefining this otherwise gracious gesture as being more melodramatic than
realistic. To begin with, there was indeed an overbearing victor and a compliant vanquished.
This is not to downplay the rare and exceptional restoration of stability after the war, which,
up until that point, was perhaps only matched by what had occurred at the end of WWII
between allied forces on the one hand and the Nazis (and their supporters) on the other.
Ongoing or lingering conflicts in nations like Israel, Afghanistan, the Congo and Somalia,
and “concluded” conflicts in nations like Liberia and Rwanda reinforce the outstanding
manner in which the Nigeria-Biafra War was formally brought to an end. In the former
situations, the conflicts have ultimately persisted and even when the weapons have stopped
blazing an awkward aura of commotion and unease remains. Without the intervention of the
United Nations or its standard peacekeeping force, or of other international initiatives, some
of which are drawn out and rarely conclusive, the Nigeria-Biafra peace accord achieved a
commendable degree of resolution and restored a profound measure of social normalcy.
Yet, it is this seeming state of calm that has proven most effective in masking the
truth that the goals of the
federal side
1
are still being pursued and relentlessly sustained. If the
war ended only paper, in principle this means that it is still ongoing. This truth becomes even
more evident if we revisit the reasons why federal and northern leaders
2
initially resolute
about ridding themselves of unwanted easterners would finally renege on agreements that
would have ensured such severance, albeit under a unique national framework.
3
The final
decision to resort to fierce and uncompromisingly brutal means of preventing easterners from
breaking free, forces a set of endless questions that address the convoluted nature of this
unforeseen turnaround. After the federal side went back on its promise to honor the Aburi
agreement, thanks to tactical reassessments by Federal Permanent Secretaries (and most
likely the influence of foreign interests like the British), it was clear that its motive was more
economically and politically based than it was for the sake of national unity.
4
On this
inconsistency, many have cited the presence of huge and yet-to-be-tapped deposits of crude
oil in the southeast as a foremost reason. But there were other reasons for this sudden change
of heart and eagerness to “unite” with an apparently despised people.
Resource & Economic Control
1
I use the word “federal side” in acknowledgement of the fact that the Civil War has been typically described as
a war between Biafra and the “federal side” or “Federal Government” (or “Nigeria”).
2
While the enemies of easterners at this time were not restricted to northerners, the north more than any other
region expressed the most intense obsession with eliminating easterners, particularly Igbos.
3
In
Biafra: Selected Speeches and Random Thoughts of C. Odumegwu Ojukwu
(Vol. 1) (New York: Harper &
Row, 1969), Ojukwu claims that in phone conversations with Gowon, he (Gowon) specifically stated that his
goal was separation (5). There are also claims that the “Araba” chant (a call for separation) became popular in
the north following the second coup. Whatever the truth, the “unity” rallying cry of the federal side has come
under severe scrutiny and strong doubts have been raised regarding its authenticity.
4
For details on the Aburi agreement, see
Biafra: Selected Speeches and Random Thoughts of C. Odumegwu
Ojukwu
(Vol. 1), 86-88 and Philip Efiong,
Nigeria and Biafra: My Story
(New York: African Tree Press, 2010),
158-165.
Belonging to a nation that was increasingly emerging as an oil mogul was one thing,
having full control of the prized commodity was a different thing entirely. The Aburi accord
had proposed a power sharing formula that would have actually reduced some of the powers
of the Federal Government and granted the states more powers. Under a situation like this,
southeasterners, even under a unified Nigeria, would have still been prevailing decision
makers regarding the exploration and exploitation of their natural resources and the
utilization of the wealth that would accrue thereof. To secure the autocratic powers of the
Federal Military Government and clip some of the powers of the states, Gowon’s shrewd
decision to create 12 states on May 27, 1967 resulted in the equivalent of an
ethnic
divide and
rule maneuver. Aside from weakening overall minority support for the dominant “Igbo”
5
east,
this decision also eliminated the notion that a natural resource belonged to a single region or
ethnic group. Now the property of a number of states, the Federal Government could validate
its declaration of the resource as national property and gradually inch its way into
appropriating it.
Meanwhile, the events of 1966-67 had proven that the military was fast emerging as a
formidable politico-economic force to contend with. Garnering dominant military power
would therefore become one of Nigeria’s missions. The process was greatly facilitated by the
conducive location of most major military institutions in the north (at secondary and post-
secondary levels). Prominent among these are the Nigerian Military School (formerly Boys
Company), Zaria; the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI), Jaji, Kaduna; the Nigerian
Defense Academy, Kaduna; and the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC), Kaduna.
6
Later, other prominent and prestigious institutions would also be established: the National
5
Although distinctions are made between “Igbo” and “Ibo,” in this paper I will keep things simple by using
“Igbo” throughout to represent the people and their language. I regret if anyone is offended by this decision.
6
Ibrahim Babangida, Muhammadu Buhari, the late Sani Abacha and the late Mamman Vatsa are among well-
known officers that passed through NMTC.
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos; the Training and Doctrine Command,
Minna; the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna; and the National
Defense College, Abuja (formerly National War College).
7
Kalu N. Kalu has reacted to the
upsurge in the postwar creation of these officer-centered institutions, suggesting that, aside
from offering military training, most of them are merely “indoctrination” and “‘political’
centers” deliberately designed to convince “the military elite that political governance may in
fact be a part of their manifest destiny.”
8
He goes on to describe these facilities as becoming
increasingly “redundant to the extent that many of their functions duplicate each other” since
they invariably handle “specialized training of the officer corps in both military logistics and
general administration….”
9
After Gowon created 12 states from the former four regions, he appointed military
governors to all of them, except East Central State to which he appointed a civilian
administrator, Ukpabi Asika. His message was clear in his refusal to give any Igbo military
officer such recognition or legitimacy. Of course not all Igbo officers had prior knowledge of
the first coup, or even sanctioned or took part in it. It was an Igbo officer, the late Major
General J.T.U. Ironsi, after all, that had foiled it. Surely Gowon could have found a loyal,
worthy Igbo officer to fill the position, but he deliberately refused to appoint one. Up until
that point, southerners in general had dominated the officer cadre of the Nigerian army. They
did so through a fervent pursuit of educational and vocational training; they were not
recipients of political gifts.
10
Partly instigated by the British, there would be a desperate move
7
Though some would argue that this facility is not in the north, it is certainly more accessible to the north than it
is the south.
8
Kalu N. Kalu,
State Power, Autarchy, and Political in Nigerian Federalism
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008),
113.
9
Kalu N. Kalu, 113.
10
In his book,
The Trouble with Nigeria, Reissue Edition
(Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 2000), Chinua Achebe
recaptures this adventurous, outgoing, and ambitious spirit among easterners (particularly Igbos) when he says,
“Unlike
the Hausa/Fulani he was unhindered by a wary religion and unlike the Yoruba, unhampered by
to recruit northerners into the officer corps from the late 1950s and into the 60s, and to
accelerate their advancement. It is this move that resulted in the questionable but meteoric
rise of the highest-ranking northerner, Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, prior to the first coup of
January 1966. It was also this recruitment effort that eventually ushered in the likes of
General Ibrahim Babangida, rtd, into the army. Ironsi would inadvertently augment the
emergence and rise of northern officers in his attempts to appease them after the first coup.
Among the beneficiaries of his gesture were Captains Ibrahim Haruna, Murtala Muhammed,
and Mohammed Shuwa who were all promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (even
though they were Acting Majors). Usman Katsina was also promoted to the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel and he, like Murtala Muhammed, would become a key player in the
ousting and murder of the Commander-in-Chief. But perhaps the biggest beneficiary was
Gowon who Ironsi appointed Chief of Army Staff over and above his superiors. He, too,
would be instrumental in the overthrow and murder of the General.
At the end of the civil war, the
castration
of Igbo officers and a significant number of
non-Igbo officers was complete. They had either been killed or were dismissed from the
military. The dismissal of Brigadier Hillary Njoku from the army at the end of the war is
paramount here, and reinforces my point.
11
Some Igbos were reabsorbed but at ranks well
below their contemporaries. Even loyal, non-Igbo eastern officers were not spared. During
the second coup, Majors Ekanem and Isong from present Akwa Ibom State, for instance,
were murdered, and even those that remained loyal and fought on the side of Nigeria faced
considerable prejudices. Brigadier Wellington Bassey, an Ibibio officer, was one of three
highest ranking officers (majors) in the Nigerian Army in 1959, the other two being Majors
traditional hierarchies. This kind of creature, fearing no God nor man, was custom-made to grasp the
opportunities, such as they were, of the white man's dispensation” (46).
11
Brigadier Njoku disagreed with General Ojukwu on a number of issues prior to the war, and this resulted in
Njoku being incarcerated during most of the conflict. At the end of the war, what was his crime?

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