The Architect and the Bee_1983.pdf

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The Architect and the Bee: Reflections on the Work of Animals and Men
Author(s): Tim Ingold
Reviewed work(s):
Source:
Man,
New Series, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 1-20
Published by:
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801762
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AND THE BEE: REFLECTIONS
THE ARCHITECT
THE WORK OF ANIMALS AND MEN*
TIM
INGOLD
University
of
Manchester
ON
This lecture
to
attempts answerthequestion'do animalswork?'Itis suggested
that
consciously
directed purposiveactionis not necessarily
or
thatwhichis guided by a symbolicblueprint.
A
view of animalexistence rejected: man is both an objectivepartof thephysical
is
if
mechanistic
world and a subjectiveagentactingintentionally
upon it, the same mustbe said at least of all
of
higher
animals.Intentionality actionis locatedin thesocial domain. Two views of the'social'
are contrasted: an aspect of the instrumental
behaviourby which a naturalpurpose is im-
as
instruments-
plemented; thesourceof consciouspurpose,executedthrough set of natural
as
a
in
the
amplified manby culture. separating purposeofactionfrom manner itsconduct,
By
the
of
human naturecan be relatedto morality.Likewise I distinguish social fromthe cultural.
the
Culturedivorcedfrom
socialpurposeis practically
inert: an instrumental
as
in
apparatus,
working
intimate
conjunction
withtheexecutive
equipment thebody,culture neither initiator
of
is
the
nor
theconsequenceofproduction thevehicle whichitis carried This argument
but
on.
by
overcomes
the oppositionbetweennaturaland cultural
determination, enablesus to comprehend
and
the
of
of
continuity theevolutionary
processas theresult a dynamic
interplay
betweendistinct
social
domainsof bothhumanand animalexistence.
and physical
question.He said: humanbeingswork,animals
just behave.And so we areled
of
to
directly an examination the criteria whichman may be distinguished
by
from
otheranimals,notforgetting, course,that
of
man
is
an animal.We haveto
be
from
the
consider,
too, how theconceptofworkor labour'might separated
the
notionof behaviour,and whether former
entailssome, all or none of the
marksofhumanity.
how my
distinguishing
PerhapsI havemadeitclearalready
of
littlequestion throwsinto reliefthe very foundations the studyof man.
Conceived in thisbroadestsense, anthropology
concernsitself
withjust one
a
of
of
segment theworldoflivingthings, particular
speciesproduct evolution.
And yetthesocial or cultural
claimsas theobjectofhisinquiry
a
anthropologist
distinctive
domainoflife,
conceived suchcuriously
terms
as
variously
by
hybrid
all
superorganic,
psycho-social,
extra-somatic sociocultural2, intendedto
and
to
of
conveyits irreducibility the physicalor biological conditions existence.
of
The identification thestudyof thisdomainas a branchof thestudyof man
rests
upon an assumption thecoreof our discipline:
at
thatthesocial or cultural
an
dimension existence come intobeingthrough eventor seriesofevents
of
has
in the phylogenetic
historyof the human species. This could be called 'the
doctrineof emergence'.My purpose in presenting
you with an admittedly
*MalinowskiMemorialLecturefor
I982,
givenat theLondon School of Economics& Political
Scienceon 3 March.
Man (N S.)
i8,
1-20
is anything simple, is evident
from response a psychologist my
of
but
as
the
to
I shouldliketo putto you a simplequestion.Itis: do animalswork?The answer
2
TIM INGOLD
rhetorical
questionis to open up thisdoctrine some critical
for
inspection,
and
to
the
eventually qualify visionofevolutionthat evokes.
it
Let me begin withthe celebrated
storyabout thearchitect thebee. The
and
is
narrator Marx, and his concern to establish form labourwhich,he says,
is
a
of
is 'peculiarto thehumanspecies':
A spider
carries operations
on
resembling ofthe
those
isput
weaver, many human
and
a
architect
to shameby theskillwithwhicha bee constructs cell. But whatfrom veryfirst
her
the
the
distinguishes most
incompetent
architect the ofbees, that architect built
from best
is
the
has
a
cellinhisheadbefore constructs wax(Marx
1930:
I69-70).
he
it
in
Here thepeculiarity humanlabourrests thecapacity construct, the
of
on
to
in
imagination,a model or blueprint the task to be performed,
of
priorto its
performance.
How, then,arewe to comprehend activity animals,which
the
of
are supposed to lack thiscapacity?
Marx dismissestheissue withan aside that
goes to theheartof our problem.'We arenothereconcerned', writes,
he
'with
those primitiveand instinctive
formsof labour which we share with other
animals'. But is the opposite of 'instinctive'
behaviour,whateverthatmay
thatis guided by a consciousblueprint? would appearnot.
mean, activity
It
in
it
Rather, Marx's terms, is activity
directed purposive or intent,
by
will
which
is manifested theattention
in
devotedto thetaskinhand.In whatfollows,I wish
to suggestthatthe exerciseof will and thepursuitof purposedo not depend
construction theprocedures whichthat
of
upon thesymbolic
by
purposeis to be
in
realised practice.
Whether notactivity purposive, whether follows
or
is
and
it
a genetically a culturally
or
coded template, separate
are
questions.The recogni-
I
tionof thisseparation, contend, majorimplications theway we think
has
for
aboutbothsocial and biologicalevolution.
In its most general,physicalsense,work refers any expenditure energy.
to
of
And as the biologistwill point out, forany organism-plant or animal-'it
requires work [in this sense] just to keep alive' (Harrison
I979:37).
This
is
statement almosta tautology, when is a piece of matter
for
said to be alive?
Only, answeredSchrodinger
(I945:
70),
'when
it
goes on "doing something",
and
moving, exchangingmaterialwith its environment, so forth'.Perhaps,
ask: do plantswork? To thiswe would be inclinedto
then,we should first
answer thatthey'just grow'. Do animals,then,'just grow'? Speakingas an
animal myself,I would reply categorically the negative. From personal
in
I
and
experience, know thatbodilygrowth,maintenance reproduction
depend
of a greatmanyactivities
whichhave to do, directly
or
upon theperformance
withtheprocurement subsistence.
of
Unable to synthesise
their
indirectly,
own
food, animalsmustusuallymove about in orderto obtainit, and in all but the
animalsthismovement not randombut directed
is
most rudimentary
(Thorpe
Yet we have stillnotprogressed
view ofanimalexistence.
beyonda Cartesian
ForDescartes,animals(excluding
which'did notactfrom
man)wereautomata,
knowledge, but only fromthe dispositionof theirorgans' (Descartes
I9II,
I974:
39-40).
TIM INGOLD
3
Now
it
might said ofhumanbeings,too,
be
thatwork is conductedby the organsof our bodies. But confronted
withthe
biologist's observationthat my body is 'working' (expendingenergy)even
after meal,myresponse
a
whenI am asleep or reclining
would be thatI am not
at
thesameas mybody. And itis precisely thisjuncture ourproblems
that
begin.
At what point do I, as the wilful subject in command of certainphysical
in
faculties,
enterthework process?Implicit thisquestionis some notionof a
division within the body itself,between what could crudely be called a
'maintenance
part' and an 'executivepart'. The former
containssuch essential
life-supporting
organsas theheart,
lungsanddigestive
system,
whose function-
ingis moreor less automatic, required thefact
and
by
thatthebody-unlike an
inanimate machine-is involved in a perpetual process of internalself-
reconstruction
(Monod
I972: 2I).
The latter
contains instruments detec-
the
of
sense organsand limbs (Popper
I972: 273),
which
tion and implementation,
together
provide us with the bodily means to relateto our external
environ-
ment.My existence a subjectobviouslydependsupon thefunctioning the
as
of
maintenance
part. The executivepart,however,dependsforits operationon
direction.thesubject,
standbetween two parts:sustained one, I
the
purposive
I,
by
wield theother.
But this is to speak only for myselfand my conspecifics.
What of other
species?Are we, like Descartes,to regardall animalsapartfromourselvesas
mindless
automata, beingswithout
as
will?This, curiously
enough,was Marx's
view
(I964:
I02),
and it was on thisbasis thathe was able to class domestic
animalsalongsidethemostprimitive
toolsas instruments
ofhumanlabour
(I930:
I7
I-2;
see Ingold
I980:
88). For a livingbeingto be treated instrument
as
rather
than agent of production,all intentionality
must be suppressedor denied
(Cohen
I978: 43-4).
It becomesno morethana physicalobject,a thing.Some
today would extend this view of animal existenceeven to human beings,
conceivedas instrumental
devicesforthereplication theirgenesunderthat
of
grandmaster,
natural
selection
(Dawkins
I976:
2I).
Accordingly, is supposed
it
thatthe hiatusbetween mind and brain can in principlebe closed, thatour
experience volitionis merelya cover forour ignoranceof the immensely
of
that
complexphysico-chemical
interactions actually
governbehaviour.
Wilson concludeshis Sociobiology
withthebleak premonition
thata millen-
nium of 'total knowledge' will arrivein a hundredyears, afterwhich our
subjective
selves will be condemnedto eternal
exile
(I980: 301).
By thattime,
the mind will have been 'torn down' and reconstructed the circuitry
of
as
neurons
(I980: 6;
300).
Consideringthatthe centralnervoussystemin man
'containsfromone to tenbillionneuronsinterconnected meansof about a
by
hundred
timesas manysynapses'(Monod
I972:
I38),
Wilson'sprophecy
may
Yet
seemsomewhatpremature. howeverlong thecode might
taketo crack,and
of
mechanistic
eveniftheattainment totalknowledgewereto recedeto infinity,
that Cartesian
monismobligesus to recognise
the
dichotomy
betweenmindand
an
body is ultimately illusion,albeitone we cannotlive without
(I972:
I48).
is
The fallacy thisview liesin itssupposition
thatreality coterminous
with
of
the arbitrarily
restricted
domain of phenomenathat can be handled by the
methodsof naturalscience. These methodshinge on the postulatethat an
i:ii6;
see Midgley
I978:2I0-II).
4
TIM INGOLD
'nature'constitutes final
the
of
objectified
arbiter trueknowledge.Clearly,this
postulateexcludesany consideration theworldof subjective
of
experience,
yet
we have no reason to conclude that such experienceis hence illusory.
can
Neurophysiology explaina greatdeal aboutthemechanisms thought
of
and
of
action,but nothingat all about our experience thinking doing (Thorpe
and
I974:
330). There would be no need to dwell on themechanistic
for
fallacy an
of
anthropological
audience,well aware of the limitations thenaturalscience
in
of
paradigm thestudy man(Barnes
it
an
I979: 25),
were notfor oddattitude
thatcontinuesto prevailamongstanthropologists
withregardto animals.As
of
observers manwe areespecially
for
privileged, beinghumanbeingsourselves
we areable to enter
intotheexperience thepeoplewe arestudying an extent
of
to
impossiblefortheethologist
wishingto studythebehaviourof-say-geese,
Callan
I970:
46). But itwould be quitewrongto concludefrom inability
our
to
the
penetrate experienceof otherspecies thatwe are uniquelyendowed with
will.3
subjective
I take as axiomatic the dualisticpremissunderlying entirecorpus of
the
Marx's writings thehumancondition,
on
thatman's corporealexistence an
as
integral
partof thenatural
world constitutes
boththeprecondition and the
for,
instrument hisconsciouspurposeor intentionality acting
of,
in
upon it. WhereI
is
differ in extendingthis axiom to the animal kingdom in general. The
of
Cartesian
absurdity theextreme
view that animalssave manarebutnatural
all
has
machines been succinctly by Midgley:'ifit weretrue,there
would have
put
beena quiteadvancedpointin animalevolution
whenparents
who weremerely
unconsciousobjects suddenlyhad a child who was a fullyconscioussubject'
(I978:
2I7).
The only positioncompatible
withthetheory evolutionis that
of
of
thedevelopment consciousness proceededalongsidethatof theorganic
has
structures
withwhichit corresponds
(Thorpe
I974:
3
I9-2I),
and consequently
it
that is present
withvarying
of
and
at
degrees elaboration complexity leastinall
higheranimals.Thus I have arguedelsewhere,
contra
Marx, thatthedomestic
animalin theserviceof man constitutes
labouritself
rather
thanitsinstrument,
and hence thatthe relationship
betweenman and animalis in thiscase not a
technical a social one (Ingold
i980:
88).4
but
rats evenchimpanzees
or
seeHuxley
I962,
cited
(Weber
in
I947:
I04,
though
of
to
or
Our nextstepis to relatetheintentionality purposiveness activity the
dimension of existencewe call social. This termhas been used in such an
thatI believeit now constitutes majorimpediment the
ambiguousfashion
a
in
to
attempt connectup theperspectives biologyand anthropology. clarify
of
To
theissues,let me first
explainwhatI do notmeanby 'social'. Here is Radcliffe-
Brown, in a raremomentof charm:
Fora preliminary
definitionsocial
of
phenomenaseems
it
sufficiently that
clear what haveto
we
dealwith relations association
are
of
between
individual
organisms. a hiveofbeesthere
In
are
relations association thequeen,theworkers thedrones.
of
of
and
There theassociation
is
of
animals a herd, a mother-cat her
in
of
and kittens.
These social
are
phenomena
(1952: i89).

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