After the Battle 159 - The Battle for the Reichswald (2013).pdf

(11364 KB) Pobierz

BATTLE OF THE

REICHSWALD

No. 159

£5.00

NUMBER 159

After the Battle

2013

Editor: Karel Margry

Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. Ramsey

Published by

Battle of Britain International Ltd.,

The Mews, Hobbs Cross House,

Hobbs Cross, Old Harlow,

Essex CM17 0NN, England

Telephone: 01279 41 8833

Fax: 01279 41 9386

E-mail: hq@afterthebattle.com

Website:

www.afterthebattle.com

Printed in Great Britain by

Warners Group Publications PLC,

Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH.

After the Battle

is published on the 15th

of February, May, August and November.

LONDON STOCKIST for the

After the Battle

range:

Foyles Limited, 113-119 Charing Cross Road,

London WC2H 0EB. Telephone: 020 7437 5660.

Fax: 020 7434 1574. E-mail: orders@foyles.co.uk.

Web site: www.foyles.co.uk

United Kingdom Newsagent Distribution:

Warners Group Publications PLC,

Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH

Australian Subscriptions and Back Issues:

Renniks Publications Pty Limited

Unit 3, 37-39 Green Street, Banksmeadow NSW 2019

Telephone: 61 2 9695 7055. Fax: 61 2 9695 7355

E-mail: info@renniks.com. Website:

www.renniks.com

Canadian Distribution and Subscriptions:

Vanwell Publishing Ltd.,

622 Welland Avenue, St. Catharines, Ontario

Telephone: (905) 937 3100. Fax: (905) 937 1760

Toll Free: 1-800-661-6136

E-mail: sales@vanwell.com

New Zealand Distribution:

Dal McGuirk’s “MILITARY ARCHIVE”, PO Box 24486,

Royal Oak, Auckland 1345, New Zealand

Telephone: 021 627 870. Fax: 9-6252817

E-mail: milrchiv@mist.co.nz

United States Distribution and Subscriptions:

RZM Imports Inc, 184 North Ave., Stamford, CT 06901

Telephone: 1-203-324-5100. Fax: 1-203-324-5106

E-mail: info@rzm.com Website:

www.rzm.com

Italian Distribution:

Tuttostoria, PO Box 395, 1-43100 Parma

Telephone: ++390521 29 27 33. Fax: ++390521 29 03 87

E-mail: info@tuttostoria.it Website:

www.tuttostoria.it

Dutch Language Edition:

SI Publicaties/Quo Vadis, Postbus 188,

6860 AD Oosterbeek

Telephone: 026-4462834. E-mail: si@sipublicaties.nl

The ‘Veritable’ offensive was extensively covered by the photographers of the Army

Film and Photo Unit (AFPU). Sergeants Norman Midgley, Harry Ames and ‘Slim’ Hewitt

covered the operations of the 15th (Scottish) Division; Sergeant Albert Wilkes went with

the 53rd (Welsh) Division and Sergeant Johnny Silverside and Ken Higgins accompanied

the 51st (Highland) Division, while Sergeants Charlie Crocker, Jimmy Christie and Arthur

Jones stood ready to cover the actions of the follow-up divisions later on. Captain Colin

McDougall and Lieutenant Michael Dean covered the two Canadian divisions.

Above

and opposite:

On the morning of February 8, Sergeant Hewitt pictured men of the 2nd

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, part of the 15th Division’s 227th Brigade, moving

into battle near Groesbeek. The Churchill tanks are from the 3rd Scots Guards.

OPERATION ‘VERITABLE’

Planning for what later became Operation

‘Veritable’ — a south-easterly push between

the Maas and Rhine rivers from Nijmegen in

the Netherlands through the Reichswald for-

est and into the German Rhineland — was

first begun by Lieutenant-General Sir Brian

Horrocks’ British XXX Corps in early Octo-

ber 1944, after the failure of the Arnhem air-

borne venture. The outline plan made by

XXX Corps (known as ‘Wyvern’) was handed

over to the Canadians when they relieved that

corps in the Nijmegen area in early Novem-

ber. At Headquarters First Canadian Army,

the tacit assumption was that the operation

(then known as ‘Valediction’) would be

undertaken by Canadian II Corps.

On December 6 Field-Marshal Bernard L.

Montgomery, commander of the British 21st

Army Group, visited Lieutenant-General

Harry Crerar, commander of the First Cana-

dian Army, and discussed his army’s future

operations. There is no actual record of the

discussion but the following day Crerar’s

plans section recorded that it was understood

that Montgomery desired that ‘Valediction’

should be ‘under the control of British Sec-

ond Army’, and that the Americans should

take over from his army group the area south

of Roermond (then held by XXX Corps).

That same day, December 7, at a confer-

ence at Maastricht, attended by the Supreme

Allied Commander, General Dwight D.

Eisenhower, and his two principal land com-

manders, Montgomery and Lieutenant-Gen-

eral Omar N. Bradley of the US 12th Army

Group, the question of future Allied strategy

for the war in north-western Europe was

argued out. It was agreed to keep up the

pressure on the enemy through the winter.

The main attack was to be north of the Ruhr.

This was now again to be entrusted to Mont-

gomery’s 21st Army Group, with an Ameri-

can army under command.

Just before the conference, on the out-

skirts of Maastricht, Montgomery had met

General Horrocks and discussed the opera-

tion to break through the Reichswald posi-

tion south-east of Nijmegen with him. Hor-

rocks said he would need five divisions — the

number indicated in the ‘Wyvern’ plan — if

he was given the task; and after the confer-

ence, Montgomery telephoned to say that he

would get them and that he was to start

thinking out the operation.

That same evening Montgomery tele-

phoned Crerar and said he had had a talk

with the Supreme Commander and that the

Americans would take over the southern

part of the British front. Having thought over

the Reichswald operation, Montgomery now

considered that the Canadian Army should

have the responsibility for it. The target date

was January 1, 1945. Crerar’s memorandum

of the conversation proceeds: ‘I would need

another corps for this, and XXX Corps,

including up to four infantry and one

armoured divisions, would be at disposal.

Whether I decided Canadian or XXX Corps

to do [the operation], XXX Corps would

require to be brought in on right of Canadian

Army for future reasons.’

Although Montgomery had courteously

left the formal decision to Crerar, in the cir-

cumstances he had described logic demanded

that XXX Corps should conduct the offen-

sive; and at a conference at Headquarters

First Canadian Army later that evening it was

explained, ‘First Canadian Army’s offensive

will, initially, be undertaken by British XXX

Corps.’ The code-name ‘Valediction’ was

now changed to ‘Veritable’.

Detailed planning for ‘ Veritable’ contin-

ued through the second week of December,

with close consultation between British and

Canadian headquarters. Following a confer-

ence with Montgomery on December 9,

Crerar issued a preliminary directive to Corps

Commanders on the 10th. On the 14th he sent

an amended directive. The initial phase was to

be the business of XXX Corps. Subsequently

Canadian II Corps would come in on the left.

However, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division

was to take part in Phase 1 under XXX Corps.

CONTENTS

THE BATTLE OF THE REICHSWALD

NORTH AFRICA

Western Desert Battlefield Tours

GERMANY

The International Tracing Service

UNITED KINGDOM

The Kingsclere Massacre

NEW BOOK

The Desert War Then and Now

Front Cover:

This Sherman on display outside

the Groesbeek Liberation Museum commem-

orates the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry for their

part in the liberation of the Netherlands and the

Reichswald battle. (Karel Margry)

Back Cover:

A field cemetery at Sidi Rezegh

where fierce battles raged for days in

November 1941 — pictures from

The Desert

War Then and Now.

The old tomb of a holy

man still stands, exactly the same as it did

seven decades ago.

Acknowledgements:

The main text for the

Battle of the Reichswald story is taken from

The Victory Campaign

(Volume III of the

Official History of the Canadian Army in the

Second World War) by Colonel C. P. Stacey

(Roger Duhamel: Ottawa, 1960) published by

authority of the Canadian Minister of

National Defence. For help with the

Reichswald story, the Editor would like to

thank Martijn Bakker, Marco Cillessen, Coert

Comans, Fenny Visscher and Colonel Nick

Lock. Our thanks also to Kathrin Flor of the

International Tracing Service.

Photo Credit Abbreviations:

IWM — Imperial

War Museum; LAC — Library and Archives

Canada; NIOD — Nederlands Instituut voor

Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam; USNA —

US National Archives.

IWM BU1719

On February 8, 1945, the First Canadian Army launched Operation

‘Veritable’, a massive offensive designed to conquer the northern

half of the German Rhineland and obtain positions favourable for

a later assault across the Rhine. From jump-off positions near

Nijmegen in the Netherlands, British XXX Corps (operating under

Canadian command) launched three British and two Canadian

infantry divisions in a concentrated assault towards the south-

east and into Germany. Their area of operations was narrow and

constricted by the Rhine river in the north and the Maas river in

the south. Prime obstacle to their advance was the Reichswald

Forest, an impenetrable area of dense woodland right on the

Dutch-German frontier, stretching some 14 kilometres from east

to west and eight kilometres from north to south. Through it ran

the northern spur of the daunted Siegfried Line, its defensive for-

tifications anchored on the towns of Kleve in the north and Goch

in the south. In two weeks of grim and costly fighting, the British

and Canadians battled their way through and past the forest,

overcoming mud, rain, floods and fierce German resistance. By

February 21 they had emerged from the woods, broken through

the Siegfried Line and captured both Kleve and Goch.

THE BATTLE OF THE REICHSWALD

Montgomery issued his own directive on

‘Veritable’ on December 16. The general

concept was thus stated: ‘Before we can

begin to develop successfully large-scale

operations across the Rhine we must clear

the enemy completely from the west of the

river, and must join up with the American

Ninth Army coming up from the south; we

must in fact be in undisputed possession of

all territory west of the Rhine from inclusive

the general line Orsoy-Venlo northwards.’

On the morning Montgomery issued this

directive, the Germans launched their major

counter-offensive in the Ardennes in a final

great gamble for victory in the West.

Throughout the critical battle in the

Ardennes, in spite of commitments there and

the threat to the northern front, neither

Montgomery nor Crerar lost sight of the

requirements of their Rhineland offensive.

On January 16, in conference with Crerar,

Montgomery outlined his plan ‘to get Allied

forces across the River Rhine, north of the

Ruhr, in strength’. This plan, presupposing

clearance of the Rhineland, could only be

carried out with extensive American assis-

tance and, at the time of the discussion, the

Right:

Without farms or roads to identify

the location, matching up photos in the

rolling countryside around Groesbeek is

difficult. The Argylls jumped off from

positions along Wylerbaan, the road link-

ing Groesbeek with Wyler further north.

This is the view from that road, looking

east across the fields towards Germany

and the Reichswald. The silver-steel col-

umn on the right is the Veritable Memor-

ial, erected in 1990 and commemorating

that this was the starting point for Mont-

gomery’s great offensive.

question of whether the US Ninth Army

would be left under Montgomery’s control

had not been decided. However, this diffi-

culty had been resolved when, five days later,

Montgomery issued a formal directive

announcing his intention of destroying ‘all

enemy in the area west of the Rhine from the

present forward positions south of Nijmegen

as far south as the general line Jülich-Düssel-

dorf, as a preliminary to crossing the Rhine

and engaging the enemy in mobile war to the

north of the Ruhr’. The enemy’s situation

was described in precisely the words used in

the earlier directive issued the day the battle

began in the Ardennes. Following the pat-

tern then outlined, Montgomery visualised

converging attacks by the First Canadian and

US Ninth Armies. The target date for ‘Veri-

By Colonel Charles P. Stacey

table’, the Canadian operation, was February

8; but that for ‘Grenade’, the American one,

could not yet be fixed.

Commencing on January 18, British

XXX Corps, 51st (Highland) and 53rd

(Welsh) Divisions and ancillary formations

had returned to General Crerar’s command

for ‘Veritable’. When the Army Comman-

der addressed his senior officers on the

22nd, he noted that the concentration of

‘most of the additional forces required for

the operation’ was well advanced. The

overall plan for ‘Veritable’, he pointed out,

had not been materially changed during the

ATB

IWM BU1716

CANADIAN OFFICIAL HISTORY

month-long delay imposed by the emer-

gency in the Ardennes, but remained as he

had outlined it in December. He empha-

sised how vital it was to achieve surprise —

chiefly by the elimination of ‘prolonged

preliminary bombardment’ and the substi-

tution of ‘really overwhelming fire’ from

the air and the ground as the operation

commenced, or was about to commence.

He reminded his hearers of the conse-

quence of ‘keeping the initiative, maintain-

ing the momentum of the attack and of dri-

ving on, and through, the enemy without

let-up’. And finally he directed them to

ensure that ‘all ranks taking an active part

in the operation are adequately briefed and

that all obtain a clear appreciation not only

of what is expected of them, but of the

importance of the contribution which each

man can, and must, make’.

Although the push through the dense Reichswald forest was the most daunting part

of ‘Veritable’ (a task for which the 53rd Division, in close co-operation with its

assigned supporting armoured units, had organised extensive special training in for-

est fighting in its staging areas around Helmond in the weeks prior to the operation

to discover the best methods to overcome the problem), the operation entailed more

than a push through the woods. In the north, where the Germans had flooded nearly

all of the low-lying area stretching between the forest and the Rhine river, the Cana-

dians had to resort to amphibious operations in order to carry their attacking units to

the isolated village objectives. However, most important of all was the opening of

the roads that led north and south of the forest, to Kleve and Goch respectively,

which were needed to gain the open country beyond where armoured exploitation

could take place. The most vital task fell to the 15th Division which had to open up

the narrow corridor to Kleve, requiring a rapid push between the inundated area in

the north and the forest in the south.

On January 23 Field-Marshal Mont-

gomery indicated that preparations by the

US First Army for an offensive towards

Bonn might have a delaying effect on ‘Veri-

table’ and ‘Grenade’, since the latter could

not begin until the Ninth Army had been

brought up to a strength of 12 divisions.

However, he assured General Crerar that he

would have six days’ warning of any post-

ponement of ‘Veritable’. In the interests of

Getting all the troops, guns and supplies for ‘Veritable’ concentrated into the constricted

area around Nijmegen was a major logistical operation, particularly because there were

only two good roads leading into it from the south; one across the Maas bridge at

Grave, the other across a Bailey bridge built over the Maas at Mook. The heavy traffic

wreaked havoc on these and all other roads, especially when it began to thaw, and thou-

sands of pioneers — 50 engineer companies, three road construction companies and 29

pioneer companies — were employed to maintain them. Sergeant Higgins pictured

Dutch civilians helping to repair the damage to a road in Nijmegen made by the passage

of tanks on February 8, the first day of the offensive. As they work, an endless column of

wheeled transport continues to roll past on their way to the front.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE FOUNDATION

While senior commanders and their staffs

hammered out final details of the opera-

tional plan, a great administrative ‘build-up’

provided the sinews for ‘Veritable’. The wide

scope of these requirements can only be sug-

gested here, but their importance to the suc-

cess of the operation can scarcely be exag-

gerated. Basically, there were three

essentials: rations for the troops, ammunition

for their weapons and what military termi-

nology described as ‘POL’ — that is, petrol,

oil and lubricants for their vehicles. Since the

strength of First Canadian Army was to rise

as high as 449,865 during the operations, with

civilian labour, prisoners, etc, raising the

total number of mouths to feed to 476,193 at

its peak, the problem of supplying rations

alone was no small one.

From the outset a heavy burden fell upon

the Royal Army Service Corps and Royal

Canadian Army Service Corps for the actual

movement of supplies, and on the Royal

Engineers and Royal Canadian Engineers

for the maintenance of routes and bridges.

But maintenance depended, in turn, on the

weather, and this proved fickle. Although

cold weather and firm ground persisted

throughout most of January — the tempera-

ture sank to 5° Fahrenheit on the 26th — a

thaw set in at the end of the month, and

routes soon deteriorated under the heavy

traffic. By February 5 a section of the Turn-

hout-Eindhoven road was ‘impassable even

to Jeeps in four-wheel drive’ and the Chief

Engineer at Army Headquarters commented

ruefully, ‘We have had every disadvantage

possible in weather with the highest flooding

in 14 years in November, the lowest water

level ever recorded in January, a severe frost

followed by very rapid thaw, bad icing condi-

tions and now another flood.’ For a time,

nearly 50 companies of engineers, plus three

road construction companies and 29 pioneer

companies, were fully employed in maintain-

ing the roads in the British-Canadian sector.

surprise, ‘no forward assembly of formations

concerned’ would begin until February 2.

Lieutenant-General Willam H. Simpson,

commanding the Ninth Army, was requested

to make every possible effort to launch

‘Grenade’ by the 15th. General Crerar issued

his own directive on Operation ‘Veritable’ to

the commanders of the British I and XXX

and Canadian II Corps on January 25.

One week later he was advised that D-

Day had been confirmed for February 8. It

would go in whatever the weather. ‘The C-

in-C considered that the urgency was so

great that it was undesirable to delay the

operation, even by 24 hours, in order to

obtain air support.’ This presumably

reflected a SHAEF directive issued the

same day which instructed Montgomery to

mount ‘Veritable’ ‘at the earliest date and

not later than February 8’.

The same houses still stand along Graafseweg, the main road into Nijmegen from Grave.

ATB

IWM BU1774

Plik z chomika:

Doncaster1972

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

After The Battle 076 - The French Navy at Toulon (1992).pdf (16104 KB)
After The Battle 076 - The French Navy at Toulon (1992).jpg (810 KB)
After the Battle 004 - Battle of the Bulge (1974) SCAN.pdf (32279 KB)
After the Battle 004 - Battle of the Bulge (1974) SCAN.jpg (1083 KB)
After the Battle 174 - The Battle of the Vercors (2016).pdf (20109 KB)

After the Battle 159 - The Battle for the Reichswald (2013).pdf

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: