Optimistic Rationalist in Euripides - Theseus, Jocasta, Teiresias.pdf

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Department of Classics, UCB
UC Berkeley
Title:
The Optimistic Rationalist in Euripides: Theseus, Jocasta, Teiresias
Author:
Mastronarde, Donald J.,
University of California, Berkeley
Publication Date:
01-01-1986
Series:
Classical Papers
Publication Info:
Classical Papers, Department of Classics, UCB, UC Berkeley
Permalink:
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0mn5q9c5
Keywords:
Euripides, interpretation, Phoenician Women, Bacchae, Suppliant Women
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Postprint from
Greek Tragedy and its Legacy: Essays presented to D. J. Conacher,
ed. by
Martin Cropp, Elaine Fantham, S. E. Scully (Calgary 1986) 201-211
[201]THE
OPTIMISTIC RATIONALIST IN EURIPIDES:
THESEUS, JOCASTA, TEIRESIAS
DONALD J. MASTRONARDE
University of California, Berkeley
Near the end of Act 3 of Corneille’s
Oedipe
of 1659, Thésée delivers a ringing
denunciation of fatalism:
1
Quoi? la nécessité des vertus et des vices
D’un astre impérieux doit suivre les caprices,
Et Delphes, malgré nous, conduit nos actions
Au plus bizarre effet de ses prédictions?
L’âme est donc toute esclave: une loi souveraine
Vers le bien ou le mal incessamment l’entraîne,
Et nous ne recevons ni crainte ni désir
De cette liberté qui n’a rien à choisir,
Attachés sans relâche à cet ordre sublime,
Vertueux sans mérite, et vicieux sans crime.
Qu’on massacre les rois, qu’on brise les autels,
C’est la faute des Dieux, et non pas des mortels.
De toute la vertu sur la terre épandue,
Tout le prix à ces dieux, toute la gloire est due;
Ils agissent en nous quand nous pensons agir;
Alors qu’on délibère on ne fait qu’obéir;
Et notre volonté n’aime, hait, cherche, évite,
Que suivant que d’en haut leur bras la précipite.
D’un tel aveuglement daignez me dispenser.
This defence of free will has been taken to be a profession of faith by Corneille
himself, relevant to contemporary religious debate.
2
In the light of the entire play,
however, this profession is certainly paradoxical. Although Corneille spices his version
of the discovery of Oedipus’ crimes with sub-plots of love (Dircé and Thésée) and of
dynastic rivalry (Dircé, as legitimate heir of Laïus and Jocaste,
[202]is
jealous of Oedipe,
an outsider whom she maligns as
tyran
and
usurpateur),
and although there is a
©M. J. Cropp, E. Fantham and S. E. Scully; reproduced by permission.
Postprint from
Greek Tragedy and its Legacy: Essays presented to D. J. Conacher,
ed. by
Martin Cropp, Elaine Fantham, S. E. Scully (Calgary 1986) 201-211
suggestion in the play that the shedding of royal blood under any circumstances is an
unspeakable crime,
3
in the end, when the truth is revealed, there is general agreement that
Oedipe is not blameworthy and that his life has been cruelly directed by
l’ordre du ciel.
4
The speech of Thésée seems to offer us a seventeenth-century example of the inorganic
intrusion of the dramatic poet’s voice questioning or contradicting the traditional basis of
his plot. It has often been assumed that Euripides, because of a personal scepticism about
the “truth” of traditional mythology and religious beliefs, similarly allowed professions of
personal faith to appear in his dramas. The most famous and controversial example in
Euripides is surely
Heracles
1341-1346. T.C.W. Stinton has tried to make a case for
reading these lines as an organic expression of Heracles’ disapproval rather than of a
disbelief which would jar with the assumptions of the plot; but Stinton himself confesses
doubts about his own claim.
5
In response, A. L. Brown has recently argued that the
passage is nothing more than an (inorganic) authorial pronouncement, and he goes on to
suggest that in an analogous case (IT 380-391) “we may be fairly sure that this reasoning
appealed to Euripides himself.”
6
In his recent commentary on
Heracles,
G. W. Bond
adopts an intermediate position: lines 1341-1346 seem to him adequately motivated as
“what the rhetoric of the situation demands”, but he nevertheless states that they “may
well represent Euripides’ own considered view.”
7
In this essay I hope to show why we should not be content either with the excuse of
“the rhetoric of the situation”
8
or with the admission of inorganic intrusion of the poet’s
personal beliefs when we interpret passages such as
Heracles
1341-1346 or
IT
380-391.
To do so, I shall consider three longer and (in general) less controversial speeches which
make a positive assessment of the workings of the universe and the role of the gods in the
order of the world: Theseus’ speech to Adrastus at
Supplices
195-249, Jocasta’s appeal to
her sons at
Phoenissae
528-585, and Teiresias’ defense of Dionysus to Pentheus at
Bacchae
266-327. In contrast to the Euripidean figures who reflect contemporary
intellectual culture in such a way as to arouse shock and disapproval (e.g., Jason in
Medea,
Helen in
Troades,
Eteocles in
Phoenissae,
Orestes in
Orestes),
these figures seem
to succeed in combining traditional values and intellectual modernity. They are what I
would call “optimistic rationalists”: they believe that the world is orderly and
comprehensible and that there are elements in that order which have been fashioned for
the good of man. Compared with a Jason or an Orestes, these are basically sympathetic
figures; but I wish to argue that it is too simple, and so misleading, to be satisfied with
such a reaction to them. In each case, it seems to me, the overall context undermines the
position of the optimistic rationalist and renders it sometimes futile and irrelevant,
sometimes poignant, sometimes even tragic.
The greater part of Euripides’
Supplices
presents a fairly typical story-pattern of
political supplication.
9
The wronged parties supplicate a more fortunate state; an internal
obstacle is overcome; an external opposition to reception of the
[203]suppliants
is first
expressed in threatening words and then acted out in an armed conflict off-stage; but the
©M. J. Cropp, E. Fantham and S. E. Scully; reproduced by permission.
Postprint from
Greek Tragedy and its Legacy: Essays presented to D. J. Conacher,
ed. by
Martin Cropp, Elaine Fantham, S. E. Scully (Calgary 1986) 201-211
protecting state wins and receives appropriate thanks. All or most of these features can be
found in Aeschylus’
Supplices
and (with modifications)
Eumenides,
Euripides’
Heraclidae
and
Supplices,
and Sophocles’
Oedipus Coloneus.
It is not by chance that in
four of the five cases the protecting state is Athens, for the Athenians prided themselves
on their generous acceptance of refugees and suppliants, even those who had no
particular claim to Attic protection.
10
It is especially noteworthy that in
Heraclidae
the
sons of Theseus have no hesitation in taking the suppliants’ side at once (the difficulty of
the oracle comes later as a surprise) and in
Oedipus Coloneus
Theseus almost grants
Oedipus’ request before hearing it. What happens in Euripides’
Supplices
must be viewed
against the background supplied by such examples.
The guidance provided by the pithy tag “Encomium of Athens” in the hypothesis to
Supplices
has been accepted by many critics, who believe that there is a straightforward
confidence and optimism suitable to encomium conveyed by this play and that the
positive attitude toward Athens is matched by a simple favourable attitude toward its
ideal king, Theseus. Some go so far as to read Theseus’ first long speech as the
profession of a deep personal faith held by the poet himself.
11
Theseus’ view is that the
workings of the world are fully intelligible, that the gods have provided all the resources
necessary for human success and happiness, that the course of human failure and misery
can be simply analyzed and fault clearly ascribed. For Theseus (at this point in the play)
there is a clear separation between good and bad men, prosperous and wretched men;
citizens in a state can be neatly divided into three distinct groups. Theseus thus combines
traditional respect for the gods and their ways (note in particular the rejection of trying to
be “wiser than the gods” at 216-8 and the maxim on the contagion of sinfulness at 226-8,
which echoes Aeschylus
Sept.
602ff.)
12
with the modern view of human progress and a
modern-sounding analytic clarity. It is perhaps natural that this implied profession of
faith, taken by itself, wins sympathy and approval from many readers and critics, even
though such confidence in the intelligibility of the world may be deemed non-tragic.
13
The speech of Theseus does not, however, exist in a vacuum. It is artistically located in
a complex drama, and, as Collard points out,
14
the initial movement of the drama is
designed to evoke sympathy for the unfortunate Argives and the scene which follows
Theseus’ impressive speech reasserts the claims of sympathy and brings a very rapid
change of mind. What is more, the suppliant-plot pattern itself, the pretensions of
patriotic Athenians myths, and the very stature of Theseus as symbol of Attic unity,
civilization, and service to mankind render Theseus’ coldly rational refusal a surprising,
even shocking, development. Some hesitation in the protector or a minor hindrance
imposed from outside may be an expected part of a suppliant-drama, but no one would
have expected such a direct and swift refusal from the Athenian king himself. The
dramatic context tells us, therefore, that Theseus’ speech, optimistic and rational though
it is, is undercut by irony and shown to be inadequate to the realities of the tragic world.
15
Beyond
[204]this
general irony, there are also reversals of specific statements and
©M. J. Cropp, E. Fantham and S. E. Scully; reproduced by permission.
Postprint from
Greek Tragedy and its Legacy: Essays presented to D. J. Conacher,
ed. by
Martin Cropp, Elaine Fantham, S. E. Scully (Calgary 1986) 201-211
positions. Aethra provides a more traditionally tragic view of the cyclical workings of
human fortune (331). The debate between the Theban herald and Theseus goes further by
having the herald echo elements of Theseus’ earlier speech and Theseus now take an
opposite view. It is the herald who now asserts a simple division between what is good
and what is bad, criticises the control of the assembly by the skilful tongue of a villain
(423-5, cf. 243), accuses Theseus of aiding bad men and ignoring the judgment of the
gods (486-505), and refers to “rashness” and “youth” as causes of disaster in war (508,
580). Theseus, for his part, now speaks differently of the classes of men in a city (408,
433-7; cf. 420-5) and refers to the sufferings of humanity in a manner closer to that of
Adrastus (549-555, cf. 176-9).
16
Later in the play, the encomium of the dead warriors
(855-917) casts another ironic sidelight on Theseus’ initial position. Theseus himself asks
for and then supplements the encomium (841-5, 925-931); and the gist of Adrastus’
speech is that these men were not, after all, simply bloodthirsty men of sin and violence,
but also men of moderation, bravery and public-spiritedness. So complex is the nature of
man and the course of man’s fortune.
Some critics might be tempted to say that Theseus’ positions in
Suppl.
195-249 are out
of harmony with his positions elsewhere either because they are merely due to “the
rhetoric of the situation” and the dramatic demands of the immediate moment and have
no wider relevance or because they are not in fact Theseus’ but Euripides’ own beliefs.
The latter explanation make Euripides just as clumsy as Corneille. More important, either
explanation ignores a major thrust of Euripidean drama: the presentation of a dialectic of
ideas which shift and alternate, leaving no firm ground to stand on. In Euripides the
universe and man’s soul are portrayed as fragmented and unstable, but one of the most
characteristic achievements of Euripidean man is his power of analysis and his will to
construct an order for himself, to impose intelligibility and often morality on the world he
experiences. But this is also Euripidean man’s most tragic achievement: we, the audience,
should not be misled by a character’s analytic skill, optimism, and general
high-mindedness into accepting that the construct offered is adequate and that the faith
professed is anything but futile, if in fact the drama as a whole points to inadequacy and
futility.
The second speech by an optimistic rationalist which I wish to consider is that of
Jocasta in the
agôn-scene
of
Phoenissae
(446-737). Jocasta has the longest
speaking/singing role in the play and she dominates the first third of the play. The
prologue introduces her in a narrative of subdued emotion as the long-suffering but
selfless center of the doomed family. Like Teiresias and the chorus later, she there
conveys some sense of the weight of the past which leads up to the present fatal day, but
her loyalty to her family makes her ever hopeful that a means of salvation can still be
found. Her initial address to the sun (3-5), with its implicit sense of exposing one’s woes
to the open sky for relief, and her concluding prayer to Zeus in his bright heavenly
dwelling, with its mildly “nouthetetic” element,
17
lend her role a special dignity. In her
©M. J. Cropp, E. Fantham and S. E. Scully; reproduced by permission.
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